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Rule of Law and China's Unequal Treaties: 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law and 
Its Role in Chinese International Law 
and Diplomatic Relations in the Early 
Twentieth Century 
Mitchell Chan
 The unequal treaties that hindered Chinese international 
relations for much of the one hundred years immediately 
preceding the Second World War reflected the differences 
between the traditional Chinese legal system and those in Europe 
and America. Traditional Chinese law has been characterized as a 
morals-based system of philosophy and morality, a system of rule 
by virtue rather than rule of law. The belief that the rule of law, 
if not law itself, was either inadequate or nonexistent in China 
shaped pre-modern China’s relationships with the world. At the 
same time, the introduction of foreign legal thought, facilitated 
by a wave of legal translation in China, exposed the Chinese to 
foreign notions of law, including principles of international law 
and the rule of law. Whether they believed the foreign conviction 
that they had no law, realized they needed to play along with the 
foreign view in order to restore China’s place in the world, or 
simply favored the foreign definition of the rule of law more than 
the traditional Chinese conceptions of law, Chinese thinkers in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries advocated, and 
pursued, legal reforms shaped by international standards for the 
rule of law. However, the philosophical and political texts that 
influenced traditional Chinese law contained much material 
that in modern parlance would fall under the umbrella of “law.” 
Though rulers, politics, and policies changed over the centuries, 
an ancient philosophical debate on the proper way to govern 
provided an intellectual framework that remained influential.1
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 In the nineteenth century, this model of traditional 
Chinese law became an obstacle in China’s relations with the 
great powers of Europe and America. Concern that Chinese 
law provided inadequate protection for the rights of foreign 
nationals prompted many foreign countries to negotiate treaties 
with China that granted them significant diplomatic, economic, 
and legal privileges but seldom extended similar privileges 
internationally to China. In the early twentieth century, as the 
Chinese embraced legal reforms and foreign legal knowledge, 
they tried to use international law to challenge unequal treaties. 
This demonstrated that while China had its own longstanding 
traditions of legal thought, contact with foreign countries 
introduced the Chinese to new ways of thinking about law, 
which also influenced their view of the proper way to govern 
and achieve order. On the international level, the concept of the 
rule of law became an important component in early-twentieth-
century China’s diplomatic efforts to restore sovereign rights that 
it had lost in the unequal treaties of the previous century.
Defining the Rule of Law:
Comparing the origins of law between legal systems
 Before discussing the role of the rule of law in Chinese 
international law, it is necessary to first examine where the term 
“rule of law” comes from and what it means. Although the OED 
dates the term “rule of law” to about 1500,2 use of the phrase in 
English is usually traced to the 1885 Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution by legal scholar A. V. Dicey. Dicey 
argued that the rule of law was peculiar to the common law of 
England and one of British society’s defining characteristics.3 
The concept of the rule of law is deeply rooted in the English 
common law tradition:
At some times we have seen them depressed by 
overbearing and tyrannical princes; at others so 
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luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worse 
state than tyranny itself, as any government is 
better than none at all. But the vigour of our 
free constitution has always delivered the nation 
from these embarrassments, and as soon as the 
convulsions consequent on the struggle have 
been over, the balance of our rights and liberties 
has settled to its proper level.4
 Though Dicey described the rule of law as peculiarly 
Anglo-Saxon, the concept of the rule of law can be found in 
other cultures. The ancient Greeks and Romans placed great 
importance on law as a check on government. Aristotle wrote in 
Politics that “it is more proper that law should govern than any 
one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous 
to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they 
should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants of 
the laws.”5 Roman orator Cicero drew a subtle but powerful 
connection between the law and those charged with enforcing it: 
“the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law a silent magistrate.”6 
In the civil law tradition prevalent in Continental Europe, the 
concept of rule of law is roughly equivalent to the German 
Rechtsstaat and French état de droit. Both terms are generally 
translated and thought of as the rule of law.7
 Applying such a comparison with Chinese law is less 
straightforward. To begin with, there is no Chinese word that 
exactly translates as “rule of law” (in English or any other 
language). The conventional Chinese term for “rule of law” is 
fazhi, a compound word made from the characters fa (in this 
case meaning “law,” but can also mean “fair” or “just”) and zhi 
(meaning “to govern”). Thus, rule of law could be understood in 
Chinese as “to govern fairly” or “to govern justly.” Already, the 
exactitude of the term has begun to lose its precise meaning.
 This confusion is compounded by the fact that the 
word “law,” as it is understood in the European languages, also 
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has no direct translation in the Chinese language.8 The result 
is that several distinct Chinese words are often simultaneously 
(and interchangeably) translated as “law” even though they 
have different meanings. Already we have seen the confusion 
surrounding the word fa, which means “fair” or “just” but can also 
mean “method” or “statute,” and in some cases “law.” Other words 
for “law” that can have additional meanings include lü (“model”), 
li (“ritual” or “morality”), xing (“punishment”), zhi (“control”), 
and de (“virtue”).9 So someone talking about fazhi could well be 
talking about “just control” or “fair method,” but not “rule of law.” 
The linguistics underscore the additional challenge of applying a 
European legal construct to a non-European culture.10 Although 
the rule of law in Western legal systems is typically associated 
with democratic political ideas, classical liberal democracy, and 
ideas of constitutional government, this is a Western connotation 
based on European and American experiences of the relationship 
between law and government.11 How the rule of law looks in 
practice depends on the political context of a specific society, and 
the contexts of the rule of law in European legal history are very 
different from those of fazhi in Chinese legal history.
Variations of the Rule of Law in Chinese Legal History:
The Imperial Confucian model of traditional Chinese law
 Understanding the origins of fazhi thus depends on 
understanding the origins of law in China. The historical 
development of traditional Chinese law was shaped by centuries-
long philosophical debates about the proper way to lead and 
govern—what might be termed political philosophy. Two schools 
of philosophical thought, Confucianism and Legalism, had a 
particularly significant influence in shaping the development of 
traditional Chinese law. In discussing the two schools, it helps 
that each had its own set of Chinese words to describe specific 
legal concepts that were central to their respective philosophies. 
Although neither school was explicitly a legal tradition, each had 
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its own views on how society should be governed and the role of 
law in societal ordering.
 The Confucian school was grounded in the concept of 
li (meaning “morality,” though the word originally referred to 
social rituals). Li emerged during the Western Zhou dynasty (c. 
1046-771 BC), a period when ancient China was divided into 
feudal vassal states that owed fealty to the Western Zhou kings. 
The Duke of Zhou, regent for the second Western Zhou king, 
developed the doctrine that heaven had given the king the right to 
rule as long as he worked to “harmonize heaven with morality.”12 
Thus, the Duke of Zhou turned li into a law-like form of control 
over the activities of the nobility, whose loyalty and deference to 
the king’s authority were necessary to maintain the feudal system.
 Morality took on additional meanings centuries later 
as the Zhou kings lost control over their increasingly rebellious 
vassals, a period known as the Spring and Autumn period (771-
476 BC). During this period, Confucius (551-479 BC) took 
inspiration from the Duke of Zhou’s use of li to govern the 
nobility’s behavior and broadened it to apply to the behavior of 
all social classes.13 Confucian philosophy linked government to 
ethics, ethics to education, and education to social control. In the 
Confucian model of government, rulers governed through li by 
educating individuals who deviate from socially accepted rules 
of behavior—the intention being that education would instill 
culprits with li so that they did not break rules in the future. This 
was how a government established and maintained control over 
the people.14
 In a Confucian society, it was crucial that political 
leaders had superior morality to educate the people by example. 
The Book of Rites, a Confucian classic text, describes the ruler’s 
role not as administrator or lawmaker, but as that of role model: 
“The demeanor of the son of Heaven15 should be characterized 
by majesty; of the princes, by gravity; of the Great officers, by a 
regulated composure; of (inferior) officers, by an easy alertness; 
and of the common people, by simplicity and humility.”16 The 
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importance of the leader’s example in the Confucian school has 
led to its view of li to be described as “rule by virtue” or “rule by 
man.” This differs from the “rule of law” in that, significantly, 
“rule by virtue” depended on the actions of a single powerful 
leader. Rule by li was not what would be recognized as rule of 
law.
 The Legalist school opposed many core elements of 
Confucian legal philosophy. Whereas Confucianism was based 
on li, Legalism was based on fa (originally meant “methods” but 
came to mean “human-made law”) and xing (“punishments”). In 
952 BC, a nobleman called the Marquis of Lü, prepared a new 
penal code that codified many existing criminal punishments 
into a new set of laws. This document, called the Lü Xing, is one 
of the oldest surviving legal codes in Chinese history.17 The Lü 
Xing described the political purpose of creating penal laws:
All who became liable to those punishments were 
dealt with without distinction, no difference 
being made in favour of those who could offer 
some excuse…Hence, (if anything more were 
wanted), the clear adjudication of punishments 
affected the regulation of the people, and helped 
them observe the regular duties of life.18
 Legalist philosophy maintained that humans were 
persuaded not by morality and education, but rather by 
punishment and reward.19 In this sense, the Legalist school 
viewed law, especially penal law, as a political tool to control the 
population. A commonly-cited summary of Legalist thought 
comes from the Guanzi, a text traditionally attributed to Legalist 
politician Guan Zhong, who advised that “The ruler creates the 
law; the ministers abide by the law; and subjects are punished 
by the law. All are subject to law.”20 The implication was that 
everyone was somehow subjected to the authority of law, and this 
was how rulers control behavior and maintain order in society. 
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 Traditional Chinese law, as it was practiced for most 
of China’s history, is a fusion of legal ideas taken from the 
Confucian and Legalist schools. When the State of Qin, one 
of the former Zhou vassal states, completed its conquest of its 
neighbors in 221 BC, its rulers embraced the Legalist school 
and applied it zealously across their new territories, now ruled 
as a unified empire under the Qin. However, the Qin applied 
Legalist standards of punishment so severely that after the Qin 
empire collapsed, Legalist philosophy was tainted by association 
with the fallen regime. Under the succeeding Han dynasty (206 
BC-AD 220), whose rulers took over the empire unified by Qin, 
Confucianism became the state-sponsored school of thought 
instead of Legalism.21 Legalist views, though officially banned, 
did not disappear, however.22 Confucian historian Sima Qian, 
writing in 94 BC after Qin’s fall, observed:
The Legalist school is stern and lacks compassion. 
However, its rectification of the proper 
relationship between ruler and his ministers, and 
its insistence on the differentiation between the 
superior and the subordinate, should be upheld 
without change. The Legalist school does not 
discriminate on the basis of closeness of personal 
relationship or status of noble lineage but makes 
decisions based uniformly on law. Thus, the 
sentiments of kinship and respect are eradicated. 
Such a way of conducting affairs can only be a 
temporary expediency but cannot succeed in the 
long term.23
 The fusion of Legalist and Confucian conceptions of 
law was in part a response to the desire of Emperor Wu of Han 
(157-87 BC), widely considered one of the most ambitious 
Chinese emperors, to establish a clear claim to rule. Educated 
by Confucian scholars, Emperor Wu appreciated the Confucian 
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doctrine ruling involved “harmonizing heaven with morality.” 
At the same time, Confucian scholars in the early Han period 
did not always prove able public administrators. For the most 
part, the individuals who possessed the bureaucratic skills and 
experience needed to govern the unified empire were former 
(Legalist) Qin officials.24 As a result, Legalist knowledge remained 
an intellectual presence in the Han government. Additionally, 
the Legalist belief in punishment as a deterrent against improper 
behavior still compelled many administrators and many Han 
officials understood that law and punishments were good ways 
of achieving social control.25 Thus, Imperial Confucianism 
combined the desired ends of Confucianism with the means 
of Legalism. Imperial Confucianism gave official recognition 
to the general idea behind Legalism, that punishments were a 
realistic way of exercising social control. The difference was that 
under Imperial Confucianism, the goal of law enforcement was 
to promote a moral, harmonious society, not merely to punish 
people for misbehaving.26
 A remarkable thing about this new model was how long 
it lasted. As a legal system, Imperial Confucianism lasted from 
the early Han dynasty up until the end of Imperial China itself 
with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.27 The general nature 
of imperial government and the overall manner in which the 
country was governed remained largely consistent. If society 
defines law as an institution for governing behavior that operates 
independently from the individual wills of the rulers, then the 
Imperial Confucian legal system was one of the oldest unbroken 
legal systems in history.
Beginning of the Unequal Treaties
 In the nineteenth century, the traditional Chinese legal 
and political system had a rough awakening at the end of the 
First Opium War (1839-1842) – a series of land and naval battles 
between the United Kingdom and the Qing dynasty.28 While 
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some contemporary observers identified trade issues, particularly 
the right of British merchants in China to sell opium (officially 
banned under Qing law) as the cause of the war, legal issues also 
contributed to the British decision to dispatch a military force 
to the Chinese coast in 1840.2930 In a February 1840 letter to 
the Daoguang Emperor, then ruler of the Qing, British Foreign 
Secretary Viscount Palmerston repeatedly identified concerns 
about the nature of Chinese law:
Now if a Government makes a Law which applies 
both to its own Subjects and to Foreigners, 
such Government ought to enforce that Law 
impartially or not at all. If it enforces that Law 
on Foreigners, it is bound to enforce it also upon 
its own Subjects; and it has no right to permit its 
own Subjects to violate the Law with impunity, 
and then to punish Foreigners for doing the very 
same thing…
the British Government would not have 
complained, if the Government of China, after 
giving due notice of its altered intentions, had 
proceeded to execute the Law of the Empire, and 
had seized and confiscated all the opium which 
they could find within the Chinese territory, and 
which had been brought into that territory in 
violation of the Law. The Chinese Government 
had a right to do so, by means of its own officers, 
and within its own territory…
But for some reason or other known only to the 
Government of China, that Government did not 
think proper to do this. But it determined to seize 
peaceable British Merchants, instead of seizing 
the contraband opium; to punish the innocent 
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for the guilty, and to make the sufferings of 
the former, the means of compulsion upon the 
latter; and it also resolved to force the British 
Superintendent, who is an officer of the British 
Crown, to become an instrument in the hands 
of the Chinese Authorities for carrying into 
execution the Laws of China, with which he had 
nothing to do.31
 
 The Qing dynasty found itself suing for peace by 1842 
when it became clear that the country was in no position 
militarily to continue fighting the British. The Qing official 
sent by the emperor to negotiate the peace settlement, an 
imperial clansman named Keying,32 did not receive any clear 
guidance from the emperor for diplomatic objectives beyond 
the withdrawal of British military forces from Qing territory.33 
His bargaining position already weak following Chinese military 
losses at British hands, Keying’s negotiations were not aided by 
the fact that neither the emperor nor his foreign policy advisors 
had a clear understanding or interest in the political, commercial, 
and (yes) legal demands that the British wanted.34 The Daoguang 
Emperor wrote to Keying during the negotiations that “the whole 
business is trifling and tedious” and asked why the British did not 
understand that “trade and commerce in different places should 
go by the old rules and there is no need to make changes.”35
 The 1842 negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Nanking, 
signed on August 29, 1842, and the subsequent Treaty of the 
Bogue in 1843 which supplemented and clarified the Treaty of 
Nanking. This began a century-long trend of agreements in which 
China was not treated as an equal negotiating party by foreign 
“treaty powers,” who compelled the Chinese to make significant 
concessions.3637 China entered into anywhere from five hundred 
to over one thousand such unequal treaties during the 100 years 
between the end of the First Opium War and the Second World 
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War.3839
 
 While the Treaty of Nanking (and many subsequent 
treaties) addressed foreign rights to trade in China, the 
negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Nanking also introduced 
two important legal concepts that would feature in Chinese 
debates on international law for the next century: most-favored-
nation status and extraterritoriality. The Most-Favored-Nation 
Clause to the 1843 Treaty of the Bogue, added at the last minute 
before the treaty was signed, was meant to ensure that any future 
concessions China made to a different foreign country would 
also be automatically accorded to the British.40 The Most-
Favored-Nation Clause in the Treaty of the Bogue provides: 
“should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be 
British War Ship sinking Chinese junks (sailing ships) in the Second Battle  of 
Chuenpi (January 7, 1841). Britain's victory in this battle started the negotia-
tions that resulted in the Treaty of Nanking.
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pleased to grant, additional privileges or immunities to any of 
the subjects or Citizens of such Foreign Countries, the same 
privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by 
British Subjects.”41 The cascading effect of the Most-Favored-
Nation Clause ensured that unequal treaties became greater and 
greater liabilities as more countries pressured China into entering 
into similar treaties with them.
 The importance of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause is 
perhaps eclipsed by the still greater, and more notorious, concept 
of extraterritoriality. Under extraterritoriality, the Chinese 
government ceded its legal authority over foreign nationals 
whose countries had treaties with China granting their nationals 
extraterritorial rights in China. Foreign nationals whose countries 
had such treaties remained subject to the laws of their home 
country despite their physical presence on Chinese territory.42 
As Palmerston’s letter to the Daoguang Emperor made plain, 
the British had little confidence in the traditional Chinese legal 
system to protect the safety, property, and interests of British 
subjects living and trading in China. This concern prompted the 
British, under diplomat and colonial administrator Sir Henry 
Pottinger, to introduce a clause into the Treaty of the Bogue that 
would allow British subjects in China to remain under British 
law, not Chinese law.
 Keying and other officials advising the Daoguang 
Emperor, eager to simply resolve conflict with the foreigners, 
agreed to this.43 However, this concession fundamentally altered 
the Chinese government’s experience with foreign nationals. 
Perhaps more than any other concession, the Qing dynasty’s 
acquiescence to the British extraterritoriality clause in 1843 set 
China up for a century of international inequality. Just a year 
after the signing of the Treaty of the Bogue, Caleb Cushing, 
United States Minister to China, demanded extraterritoriality 
rights for American citizens in China.44 The resulting Treaty 
of Wanghia between the Qing dynasty and the United States, 
signed by Keying and Cushing on July 3, 1844, included a clause 
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on extraterritoriality that closely mirrored its British counterpart 
in the Treaty of the Bogue:
Regulation XIII of the General Regulations, part 
of the Treaty of the Bogue:
Regarding the punishment of English criminals, 
the English Government will enact the laws 
necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will 
be empowered to put them in force; and regarding 
the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will 
be tried and punished by their own laws.45
Article XXI of the Treaty of Wanghia:
Subjects of China who may be guilty of any 
criminal acts towards citizens of the United 
States, shall be arrested and punished by the 
Chinese authorities according to the laws of 
China: and citizens of the United States, who 
may commit any crime in China, shall be subject 
to be tried and punished only by the Consul, or 
other public functionary of the United States, 
thereto authorized according to the laws of the 
United States.46 
 While immunity from local laws for foreign nationals 
was not unheard of, such immunity was typically restricted to 
diplomats and their families and staff.47 The extraterritorial rights 
iterated in the Treaty of the Bogue and the Treaty of Wanghia 
applied to all nationals of the countries named in the treaties. 
Such arrangements deviated significantly from international 
norms.48 They also differed from previous Chinese legal precedent 
on criminal jurisdiction of foreign nationals:
The Chinese notion of territorial sovereignty 
and jurisdiction, as entertained, though at times 
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vaguely, by the officials of the Empire in the early 
days, was not essentially different from that which 
is maintained by modern international jurists. 
Within the territory of the Empire the imperial 
laws were supreme; foreigners who went there 
were permitted to stay only on sufferance; they 
were under the same obligation as the Chinese 
subjects to obey them and subject to the same 
penalties enacted to punish their violation. This 
notion was vigorously followed by the Chinese 
rulers in their intercourse with the westerners.49
The loss of jurisdiction to such a significant degree within its 
own borders highlights how the differences between traditional 
Chinese law and the legal systems of countries like the Britain 
and the United States were becoming an international liability for 
China. The legal concerns in Palmerston’s letter to the Daoguang 
Emperor50 and the significance of extraterritoriality in settling 
questions of legal jurisdiction indicate that foreign attitudes 
on the nature of law in China were key factors in the way they 
interacted with China. Thus, it is important to understand 
exactly what foreign, particularly European, observers of China 
thought about its law and legal system.
 Perhaps the earliest, and certainly the most far-reaching, 
commentary on Chinese law in Europe comes from Montesquieu’s 
The Spirit of the Laws in 1748.51 Montesquieu correctly identified 
the Confucian model of rule by virtue, “a barrier which men 
have placed within themselves to prevent the corruption of each 
other…confounded their religion, laws, manners, and customs; 
all these were morality, all these were virtue.”52 However, 
Montesquieu viewed this form of lawmaking as despotic, “in 
which laws “in vain did this arbitrary sway, laboring under its 
own inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its 
chains.”53
 In the nineteenth century, rampant corruption and 
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administrative incompetence in the late Qing period, though not 
directly the result of the Imperial Confucian model of traditional 
Chinese law, certainly contributed to negative foreign opinion 
of Chinese law. In 1846, German missionary Karl Gützlaff, who 
had translated for the British in the negotiations after the First 
Opium War, wrote that Chinese magistrates had lost much of 
their power to govern the local populace.54 Gützlaff observed two 
important differences between nineteenth-century European 
and Chinese criminal law: that defendants in Chinese criminal 
trials were seldom represented by attorneys and that Chinese 
magistrates appeared to possess almost unrestricted power when 
issuing verdicts and criminal punishments. This power was easily 
abused:
All evidence they may bring forward is listened 
to; when, however, the actual trial takes place, the 
prisoner is solely at the mercy of the Mandarin, 
who pronounces his sentence unshackled by any 
guide but his own will, and clothes it in legal 
language, citing chapter and verse of the code. 
Appeal to a higher court is perfectly legal, though 
every step taken involves heavy expenses, and 
the meanest individual may carry his case to the 
Court of Requests at Peking. The proceedings in 
the Court itself are very summary; the accused 
appears, a few questions are put to him, and he 
is instantly sentenced, without much reference to 
his answers.55
 This idea that Chinese law consisted of individual “legal” 
pronouncements also extended to private or civil matters like the 
regulation of trade. In the years leading up to the First Opium 
War, British diplomats and merchants repeatedly expressed 
frustration with what they saw as deliberate attempts by the Qing 
government to restrict British trade and punitive measures to 
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dissuade individuals (British or Chinese) who tried to maintain 
that trade. An 1824 memoir by John Francis Davis, then an East 
India Company employee based in Canton, the only Chinese 
port in which foreign merchants could legally trade prior to the 
Treaty of Nanking, described:
Any person at all acquainted with the early 
history of our inter course with China, when 
every separate ship of the Company transacted 
its own business, and when that intercourse in 
many points resembled what a free trade would 
make it, must have been struck by the endless and 
intolerable grievances to which we were subjected 
by the Chinese, and which frequently reduced 
us to the brink of giving up the commerce 
altogether.56
 
 
Late Qing government official (also called a mandarin) presiding over court 
proceedings, 1889 
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 Concerns that the Qing dynasty was making it 
unreasonably difficult for British merchants to legally trade in 
China have been identified as one of the major causes of the First 
Opium War and Britain’s subsequent negotiation of the Treaty 
of Nanking with China. Contemporary accounts of British trade 
in China before the Treaty of Nanking frequently discuss the 
Chinese legal environment surrounding foreign trade. Chinese 
officials unfairly targeting British businesses and property are 
recurring themes. In a report to Queen Victoria written after 
the First Opium War, British colonial administrator Robert 
Montgomery Martin noted that in January 1840, before the 
war, the Qing government had made a law singling out British 
subjects for special treatment:
[January 14th] brought an edict from the 
Emperor, approving of all that had been done, 
and ordering a distinction between to be made 
in the future treatment between the English 
and other nations. As to the petty duties paid 
by the English, it was not to be deemed worth a 
consideration. Foreigners of other nations were 
ordered to be submissive, but if they sheltered or 
protected the English, or conveyed them or their 
property into Chinese harbors, their punishment 
would be great.57 
 Britain’s decision to negotiate the Treaty of Nanking was 
an effort to address these concerns and protect the rights and 
property of British subjects in China. The British government’s 
opinion of Chinese law as arbitrary and punitive, especially 
after Chinese officials specifically targeted British subjects as 
noted in Palmerston’s letter in 1842, meant that in their minds, 
extraterritoriality was a necessary guarantee against the abuse of 
government power, which the British believed Chinese law could 
not provide.
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 Treaty powers often reiterated their extraterritorial rights 
in successive treaties, clarifying or expanding the forms that 
consular jurisdiction in China would take. This trend began with 
the Treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858 in the modern-day city 
of Tianjin (then spelled Tientsin). When the Treaty of Nanking 
failed to improve trade and political relations with the Chinese, 
Britain, aided by France and the United States, fought the Qing 
again in the Second Opium War (also called the “Arrow War”). 
The Treaty of Tientsin ended the first phase of this war, which 
continued until 1860.58 Legal concerns featured prominently in 
the treaty. The Qing signed two versions of the Treaty of Tientsin, 
one with the United States and one with Britain. The American 
version of the treaty, signed on June 18, 1858, included no less 
than three articles on extraterritoriality and jurisdiction over 
American citizens. Article XI reiterated the Treaty of Wanghia in 
that Chinese subjects were subject to Chinese law and American 
citizens were subject to American law. Article XXIV established 
different legal protocols for Chinese and Americans seeking 
redress for unpaid debts. Per the new treaty, Chinese subjects 
who owed debts to American citizens could be pursued in both 
Chinese courts and by American consular officials. An American 
who owed debts to a Chinese individual, however, could only be 
pursued through American consular authorities.59
 The British version, signed on June 26, 1858, shortly 
after its American counterpart, was somewhat more equal in 
that it stated that British and Chinese authorities both had 
responsibility for apprehending Chinese who owed debts to 
Englishmen and vice versa,60 but this version still stated rather 
unequivocally that “all questions in regard to rights, whether 
of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the British authorities.”61 The British 
version of the treaty also required the Qing government to “at all 
times afford the fullest protection to the persons and property 
of British subjects, whenever these shall have been subjected to 
insult or violence. In all cases of incendiarism or robbery, the local 
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authorities shall at once take the necessary steps for the recovery 
of the stolen property, the suppression of disorder, and the arrest 
of the guilty parties.”62 The treaty did not include any parallel 
to this article that required British consular officials to protect 
Chinese individuals and property to this degree should the guilty 
party be a British subject, an important omission considering 
that such an individual would be immune from arrest and 
prosecution from Chinese authorities under extraterritoriality.
 In an English-language memoir America, Through the 
Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat, British-educated Chinese 
lawyer Wu Tingfang, who served as Minister to the United 
States under the Qing dynasty and later as Foreign Minister 
of the Republic of China,63 highlighted a particularly unequal 
set of treaties with the United States concerning Chinese 
immigration. Throughout the late nineteenth century, American 
laws increasingly restricted rights of Chinese to immigrate to the 
United States, often contrary to treaties between the Qing and 
the United States on the subject.64
 In 1868, the United States and China had signed the 
Burlingame Treaty, negotiated by United States Secretary of State 
William H. Seward and United States Minister to China Anson 
Burlingame, the latter for whom the treaty was named. The 
Burlingame Treaty was probably the first treaty that the China 
signed which was not completely unequal, giving the Qing an 
unprecedented number of concessions from the United States 
government.65 These included broad legal rights for Chinese to 
settle and trade in the United States:
The United States of America and the Emperor 
of China cordially recognize the inherent and 
inalienable right of man to change his home and 
allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the 
free migration and emigration of their citizens 
and subjects respectively from the one country 
to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, 
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or as permanent residents. The high contracting 
parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other 
than an entirely voluntary emigration for these 
purposes.66 
 Although ostensibly meant to prevent forced migration, 
this wording was interpreted as allowing for Chinese immigration 
and providing for Chinese rights of residence in the United States 
that mirrored those given to American citizens in China by the 
Treaty of Wanghia.67 Even more remarkably, the Burlingame 
Treaty reciprocated the most-favored-nation status that the 
United States enjoyed in China. The treaty text itself uses the 
word “reciprocally” when discussing most-favored-nation 
status,68 which was this time given to the Chinese. Wu Tingfang 
took great care to highlight Article VI of the Burlingame Treaty:
Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in 
China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities 
or exemptions in respect to travel or residence as 
may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects 
of the most favored nation, and reciprocally, 
Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the 
United States, shall enjoy the same privileges, 
immunities or exemptions in respect to travel or 
residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens 
or subjects of the most favored nation.69 
 Unfortunately, for China, the good news did not last. 
Within a few years, the United States reneged on the promises 
made in the Burlingame Treaty and asked the Qing dynasty 
government to renegotiate the treaty. Wu Tingfang blamed 
pressure from American labor unions to curb the immigration 
of cheap Chinese labor for this reversal.70 In 1880, a renegotiated 
treaty undid many of the reciprocal diplomatic and legal 
concessions made by the United States to China.71 The Angell 
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Treaty, named after James Burrill Angell, United States Minister 
to China, did not hide that it was the United States who 
unilaterally decided to replace the Burlingame Treaty and that 
the Chinese reluctantly agreed despite having previously reached 
an understanding with the United States.72 The 1880 treaty 
preserved rights of residence and trade as well as most-favored-
nation status for five classes of Chinese subjects in the United 
States—scholars, students, merchants, tourists, and Chinese 
laborers already living in the United States—but gave the United 
States government the unilateral right to “regulate, limit, or 
suspend” all other types of Chinese immigrants to the United 
States.73 This contradicted the United States’ previous insistence 
on “the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home 
and allegiance” stipulated in Article V of the Burlingame Treaty.74
 In 1894, the United States asked the Chinese government 
to revisit treaty provisions on immigration again. Between the 
signing of the Angell Treaty in 1880 and the new round of 
renegotiations in 1894, the United States Congress had passed 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibiting immigration of 
Chinese laborers to the United States for ten years. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act did not mention the most-favored-nation rights 
of Chinese subjects in the United States, nor did it make any 
reference to the exempt classes of Chinese subjects named in 
the Angell Treaty.75 While the Chinese Exclusion Act technically 
called for a “suspension” of Chinese immigration rather than 
an outright prohibition, which would have violated the Angell 
Treaty,76 the Act had the practical effect of curbing a significant 
amount of immigration.77 The 1882 act was extended for 
another ten years in 1892, shortly before the United States began 
negotiations for new treaty provisions.
 The resulting treaty, called the Gresham-Yang Treaty after 
the chief American and Chinese representatives who signed it, 
supported Wu’s characterization of the Chinese Exclusion Act 
as a “prohibition.” The Gresham-Yang Treaty instituted a ten-
year ban on the immigration of Chinese laborers with only a 
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few exceptions, including those Chinese laborers whose wives, 
children, or parents already lived in the United States, as well as 
the exempt classes under the Angell Treaty.7879 Wu described this 
series of events as a contravention of both norms of international 
law and other United States immigration laws:
What is most objectionable and unfair is that the 
Chinese should be singled out for discrimination, 
while all other Asiatics such as Japanese, Siamese, 
and Malays are allowed to enter America and her 
colonies without restraint…China does not wish 
special treatment, she only asks that her people 
shall be treated in the same way as the citizens or 
subjects of other countries.80 
China and the World:
The interaction and translation of foreign legal thought into 
Chinese law and legal thought
 The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
witnessed a tremendous amount of legal translation in China 
as Chinese-speaking jurists and translators produced Chinese 
translations of major works of Western law, philosophy, politics, 
history, and other subjects. In the context of legal translations, 
the practice of translating texts on Western law, particularly 
international law, into Chinese was known as yijie and is a major 
component of early modern Chinese legal history.81 This high 
period of legal translations coincided with a period of transition 
in Chinese society, during which Western ideas gained influence; 
As historian Herrlee Creel noted, “more and more Chinese came 
to realize that it would be impossible to continue to enjoy their 
traditional way of life, and at the same time to achieve the goal of 
expelling the foreigner and winning China’s independence.”82
 Concerted efforts at legal translation began during the 
last decades of the Qing dynasty (relatively late by Chinese 
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historical standards). In 1839, imperial commissioner Lin Zexu 
commissioned a Chinese translation of Emerich de Vattel’s The 
Law of Nations by American missionary Peter Parker and Chinese 
imperial interpreter Yuan Dehui.83 Later, in 1862, the Qing 
government established the Tongwenguan, a government school 
in the imperial capital Beijing to promote Western knowledge 
and languages, including the systematic translation of Western 
legal texts into Chinese.84
 One of the first major translations of Western law into 
Chinese was American missionary W. A. P. Martin’s translation of 
Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (wanguo gongfa, 
literally “public law of foreign countries”) in 1864. Martin’s 
translation broke new ground as one of the first Western texts on 
international law to be translated into Chinese by introducing a 
number of new terms into the Chinese legal language.85
 A particularly interesting word that Martin created is the 
term quanli (meaning “rights”). When Martin was translating in 
1864, there was no direct Chinese translation for the English 
word “rights.”86 Like the term fazhi (“rule of law”), quanli was 
a compound word made from preexisting Chinese characters 
that had other meanings: quan (meaning “power”) and li 
(meaning “benefit” or “interest”; note this is a different Chinese 
character than that for the Confucian term meaning “morality”). 
Martin’s new term quanli was homophonous with another, more 
established term quanli (written with a different character li) 
that meant “authority” or “political power.”87 The word quan 
(“power”) appears identically in both terms.
 The association between power and rights was preserved 
in the coining of yet another compound phrase, minquan 
(meaning “people’s power”).88 During the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, at the height of the yijie wave of legal 
translations, political reformers such as Sun Yat-sen (1866-
1925), Kang Youwei (1858-1927), and Liang Qichao (1873-
1929) advocated the collective power of the people as a way to 
strengthen the country politically. Liang, for example, wrote that 
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as “rights consciousness gets increasingly developed, people’s 
[political] duties become increasingly strong.”89 These reformers 
were primarily concerned with building up China’s political 
strength so that it could regain its sovereign rights and ultimately 
get rid of its unequal treaties.9091 Rights and the people’s power 
were meant to bolster the power of the state rather than protect 
individual citizens from the state. Rights of the people collectively 
were a step towards strengthening the country, which was why 
“people’s power” was valued more than individual rights.92 It was 
a means to an end, the end being the political development and 
ultimately acceptance of China on the international stage.
Law and International Relations:
The Systematic Introduction of the Rule of Law to Foreign 
Policy
 Concessions in unequal treaties over the second half of 
the nineteenth century made it harder for the Qing government, 
already weakened by corruption and various rebellions against 
imperial rule, to maintain control of the country. The unequal 
treaties were an important factor in the ultimate collapse of 
the Qing dynasty in 1912, whose demise marked the end of a 
several-thousand-year-old imperial dynastic tradition.93 The new 
regime, the Republic of China, was faced with a messy diplomatic 
and legal situation. Yet between 1912 and 1943, a period less 
than a third of a century, the Republic of China government 
managed to renegotiate, revise, and ultimately replace all the 
unequal treaties that crippled its predecessor. Learning from the 
Qing dynasty’s struggles, the government of the new Republic 
of China understood the importance of bringing China in line 
with modern political, diplomatic, legal, and social norms. 
Republic of China leaders understood that reforming China’s 
legal system and bringing China in conformity with modern 
norms of international law would solidify the new republican 
regime’s political legitimacy, strengthening the Chinese state 
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while restoring China’s status under the law of nations.94
 Law and the rule of law were crucial to achieving these 
objectives. There were two important connections between the 
rule of law and the abolition of the unequal treaties. First was 
that domestic legal reform would have the direct consequence of 
satisfying a major condition for renegotiating extraterritoriality 
in unequal treaties. Foreign dissatisfaction with the norms and 
customs of traditional Chinese law had been the motivation 
for pursuing and maintaining extraterritorial rights through 
treaties, and the treaty powers had already indicated a willingness 
to relinquish consular jurisdiction if there was a sufficiently 
modernized Chinese legal system to take its place.9596
 This important consideration was demonstrated in the 
1902 negotiations for a new commercial treaty between the 
Qing dynasty and Britain. The Chinese negotiators sent to 
meet with the British this time understood that legal reforms 
and reevaluating Chinese law from the perspective of foreigners’, 
particularly Europeans’, understanding of law would be necessary 
before the treaty powers would consider making concessions 
to China. One of the Chinese negotiators, Zhang Zhidong, 
raised this issue before the British: “We intend to reform our 
legal system and will appoint commissioners to prepare for this 
in the near future. Would you agree that, after our legal system 
has been overhauled, all foreign nationals [in China] ought to 
be subject to Chinese law?”97 The British subsequently pledged 
in the Mackay Treaty, signed on September 5, 1902, that “Great 
Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will 
also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she 
is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for 
their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so 
doing.”98 Thus, legal reform was a path towards the renegotiation 
of unequal treaties.
 The second reason was that international law was a 
fundamental element to the Republic of China’s strategy for 
eliminating unequal treaties. A new generation of Chinese 
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international lawyers would gradually but successfully argue 
on the international stage that the unequal treaties violated 
China’s rights as a sovereign nation under international law and 
that under international legal norms, revising and replacing the 
treaties with more equal terms was the way to restore Chinese 
sovereign rights to an equitable state.99
 During the first fifteen years after the establishment 
of the Republic of China, a period referred to as the Beiyang 
government (1912-1927) because it was based in Beijing, the 
government prioritized the study of international law as well 
as the professionalization of the Chinese diplomatic corps as 
ways of bringing Chinese foreign policy in line with accepted 
international norms. The Beiyang government established a new 
Chinese foreign ministry, called the Waijiaobu (literally meaning 
“External Intersection Ministry” or “Diplomacy Ministry,” often 
translated as “Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in 1911.100 Under the 
leadership of Lou Tseng-Tsiang,101 a former Qing diplomat who 
later served four terms as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of China (1912, 1912-1913, 1915-1916, 1917-1920), the new 
foreign ministry became a modernized government bureaucracy 
whose leaders had lived overseas, could speak foreign languages, 
and understood how foreign powers practiced international 
relations.102 Foreign-educated diplomats and lawyers comprised 
the bulk of Waijiaobu leaders: of the fourteen men who served 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Beiyang government, 
nine had been educated in the United States, Britain, Japan, or 
Germany.103 The recruitment of well-educated, cosmopolitan, and 
multilingual officials, hired through regular entry examinations, 
lent a degree of professionalism and prestige to the Waijiaobu as 
a competent and specialized institution for conducting Chinese 
diplomacy.104 The internationalism and professionalism of this 
foreign ministry attracted the attention of foreign countries and 
provided a sturdy foundation for subsequent Chinese efforts 
to conform with international standards of diplomacy and 
international law.
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 The use of law to persuade treaty powers to renegotiate 
unequal treaties required familiarity with international law and 
an understanding of foreign legal systems, knowledge that many 
Republic of China diplomats possessed. International lawyers held 
significant influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout 
the early twentieth century. China’s efforts to renegotiate and 
replace unequal treaties gave Chinese international lawyers a 
platform to broadly apply their legal training and understanding 
of law to China’s foreign policy goals.105 The significance of 
international lawyers in Chinese diplomacy persisted even after 
the Beiyang government gave way to the Nationalist government 
China: The Cake of Kings and Emperors, 1898. 
Political cartoon depicting the treaty powers of Britian, Germany, 
Russia, France, and Japan dividing China among themselves. China 
is depicted as the cake. 
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of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1935, lawyers comprised thirty percent 
of prominent diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a 
greater percentage than those who held doctoral degrees.106 These 
legal credentials added further prestige, intellectual depth, and 
professionalism to the practice of international law and ensured 
that Chinese diplomacy was sufficiently well-informed about 
legal matters to interact with treaty powers in an international 
legal framework.107
The Shantung Question:
Revisiting and replacing unequal treaties through international 
law
 China’s first major attempt at using international law to 
challenge an unequal treaty came during the First World War 
(1914-1918). In 1914, Japan declared war on the German Empire 
and subsequently invaded the German concession (territory 
legally under Chinese sovereignty but occupied by another 
through treaty rights) in the northern province of Shandong 
(also spelled Shantung). The Japanese invasion and occupation 
of Shandong violated the wartime neutrality that the Republic 
of China had declared shortly after the First World War began 
in Europe. In November 1914, Germany and its ally Austria 
surrendered to Japanese forces in Shandong.108 After Germany’s 
surrender, the Chinese government re-declared its wartime 
neutrality and requested that Japan withdraw its troops from 
Shandong Province. Japan refused. The Japanese government 
subsequently pressured Yuan Shikai, President of the Republic 
of China, to sign the Twenty-One Demands, an unequal treaty 
that recognized Japanese rights to the former German concession 
in Shandong.109 On May 7, 1915, Japan gave the Republic of 
China an ultimatum: sign the treaty by May 9 or “the Imperial 
Government will take steps they may deem necessary.”110
 After the war, Japan put forward its claims to the German 
concession in Shandong at the Paris Peace Conference (January 
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18, 1919-January 21, 1920). When Japan cited the Twenty-One 
Demands, the Chinese delegation at the conference rejected 
Japan’s argument, countering that Yuan had signed the treaty 
with Japan under coercion in wartime. The immediate threat 
posed by Japanese troops already in Shandong had prevented 
the Chinese government from finding an alternative, mutually 
agreeable diplomatic solution back in 1915:
Although threatened by the presence of large 
bodies of troops dispatched by the Japanese 
Government to South Manchuria and 
Shantung – whose withdrawal, the Japanese 
Minister at Peking declared in reply to a direct 
inquiry by the Chinese Government, they 
would not be effected “until the negotiations 
could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion” 
– the Chinese Government issued an official 
statement immediately after this satisfactory 
conclusion” had been effected under pressure of 
the Ultimatum of May 7, 1915, declaring that 
they were “constrained to comply in full with the 
terms of the Ultimatum[.]”111
 The Chinese delegation also attempted to make a 
constitutional argument that the treaties were not binding under 
domestic Chinese law because they had not been ratified by the 
Chinese legislature.112 The 1912 Provisional Constitution of the 
Republic of China required legislative approval for all treaties to 
be valid.113 However, the revised constitution of 1914 allowed the 
President of the Republic of China to unilaterally make treaties 
except when said treaty involved either a “territorial change” or an 
“increase of the burden of nationals.”114 Since foreign concessions 
were technically still Chinese territory and shifting extraterritorial 
rights in the concession between Germany and Japan had not 
caused any additional adverse effect on Chinese nationals, the 
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Twenty-One Demands did not fit either of these exceptions, so 
the constitutional argument against Yuan Shikai’s acceptance 
of the treaty with Japan was weak. Nevertheless, the use of this 
argument at the Paris Peace Conference set a precedent in China 
for abolishing treaties by constitutionally-provided for legislative 
action. The Republic of China would ultimately use this tactic 
during the Second World War, when the Chinese legislature 
voted to cancel all treaties between China and Japan.115
 The Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference 
made an additional claim against the Twenty-One Demands using 
the legal principle rebus sic stantibus (Latin for “a fundamental 
change in circumstances”).116 Under rebus sic stantibus, changes 
in circumstances, such as the state of war between the Republic 
of China and Germany after China entered the First World War 
in 1917, meant that China could no longer justify the existence 
of a German concession on its territory. Therefore, it was within 
the Republic of China’s rights under international law to claim 
the concession back despite having previously granted rights over 
the territory to Germany.117 The Chinese added that had it not 
been for Japan’s illegal action to claim the territory, “the leased 
territory of Kiaochow would in any event have been directly 
restored to China as one of the States associated with the Allied 
Powers and the United States in the war against the Central 
Powers.”118
 Prior to the start of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 
the Japanese government had enlisted diplomatic support for its 
position on the Shantung Question from Britain and France. The 
Republic of China tried to get support from the United States. 
To this end, Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to the United 
States, met with Woodrow Wilson in Washington. Wilson, 
while offering general support for China, made it clear that 
other countries had already made their own binding agreements 
between themselves regarding the Shantung Question.119 In 
a note to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono Ichirō 
on February 16, 1917, British Ambassador to Japan Conynham 
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Greene confirmed the details of a deal between the British 
government and Japan:
His Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure 
to the request of the Japanese government for an 
assurance that they will support Japan's claims 
in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in 
Shantung and possessions in Islands North of 
Equator on the occasion of Peace Conference, it 
being understood that the Japanese Government 
will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same 
spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands 
South of Equator.120 
In March 1917, Japan reached a similar agreement with France, 
with the French agreeing to support Japanese claims in China 
if the Japanese promised to pressure China into “rupturing” 
diplomatic relations with Germany after the war. Such a “rupture” 
would have included that China seize German ships located in 
China ports and require that all German nationals leave Chinese 
territory.121 It should be noted that the Chinese government was 
not informed of this agreement between Japan and France.
 While the Paris Peace Conference did see the end of 
Germany’s extraterritorial rights in China, the conference did 
not deliver China’s desired result on the Shantung Question. The 
Treaty of Versailles that resulted from the Paris Peace Conference 
gave control of the former German concession in Shandong to 
Japan instead of returning the territory to China.122 The refusal of 
the foreign powers to return the former German concession led to 
the Republic of China’s refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles.123 
The Chinese gave the following statement invoking international 
law about the loss of Shandong:
The Peace Conference having denied China 
justice in the settlement of the Shantung question 
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and having today in effect prevented them from 
signing the treaty without sacrificing their sense 
of right, justice, and patriotic duty, the Chinese 
Delegates submit their case to the impartial 
judgement of the world.124 
 
China’s loss, however, was short-lived. In 1922, the Republic of 
China had another opportunity to rally international support on 
the Shantung Question at the Washington Naval Conference. 
The United States organized the Washington Naval Conference 
(November 11, 1921-February 6, 1922) to address the future 
of regional stability in East Asia and the Pacific. While the 
agenda for the conference originally focused on the naval arms 
race between the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Italy, 
countries represented at the conference also discussed the future 
of diplomatic relations in China.125
 In 1922, China was in a better bargaining position than 
it had been in 1919. The great powers in Europe and the United 
States had become concerned about an increasingly aggressive 
Japan.126 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, an opponent of 
the Treaty of Versailles’ handing Shandong to Japan, warned his 
colleagues in the United States Senate:
The cunning Prussian of the Orient proposes to 
get a title sanctioned, warranted, and guaranteed 
by the league of nations with its holy seal affixed, 
and then it will settle the question hereafter 
whether it thinks that it is ready to give back this 
property that it has taken. It is a good thing to 
mix a little common sense even in our dreams. 
He who thinks on this matter from the practical 
standpoint of life must know that Japan, having 
laid her hand of steel upon the throat of China, 
does not intend to relax her grip.127
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 Law has been an important influence on the development 
of Chinese society at some of the most crucial periods in China’s 
long history. The development of traditional Chinese law was 
shaped by competing philosophical theories on the role of 
human-made law in governance and social control. The Han 
dynasty compromise between the virtuous moral objectives of 
Confucianism and the practical enforcement mechanisms of 
Legalism produced a type of legal system that endured the rise 
and fall of a dozen successive dynasties. In the twentieth century, 
international law gave China ways to renegotiate and ultimately 
replace the unequal treaties that had held China down during the 
previous century. Chinese desire for equitable treatment under 
international law shaped China’s foreign policy for much of the 
early twentieth century. Debates about the rule of law and the 
role that law should play in the state are a common theme in 
China’s history. Chinese law has had a rich history of fusion and 
negotiation between people and ideas—much like China today.
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